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Managing Wildland-Urban-Interface (WUI) fires is a challenging task due to the inherent complexity of 
the WUI environment. To ensure the success of strategies for the protection of population and structures, 
safety measures have to be implemented at different scales (landscape, community and homeowner). The 
present study is focused on the homeowner scale and deals with the threat related to the presence of LPG 
domestic tanks in a WUI fire scenario. Recent accidents have demonstrated that the risk associated with 
this type of installation is real, but often disregarded by residents. A methodology was developed, 
providing a set of indicators that may easily be compared with risk acceptance criteria, assessing whether 
the tank integrity of an LPG tank exposed to WUI fire scenarios is compromised or not. The methodology 
is applicable to a vast range of situations and at a different level of detail according to available data. 
Several case studies were carried out, showing that WUI fire scenarios impacting on domestic LPG tanks 
complying with regulations currently adopted in several Mediterranean countries cannot be deemed safe. 
The methodology proposed represents an advanced tool to assist on safety distances sizing to be 
prescribed by standards, driving regulators towards better-informed decision-making. 
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Forest fires affecting urban and rural communities represent an increasing problem throughout the world. 
They pose tremendous management challenges in terms of civil protection and fire mitigation (Manzello 
et al., 2018). These emergencies often exceed fire-fighters capacities due to their multi-risk nature: they 
usually involve wildfire suppression, structures protection and communities’ evacuation, and they can 
even trigger Natech events when interfacing industrial infrastructure(Cozzani et al., 2014; Khakzad, 
2019; Khakzad et al., 2018; Krausmann et al., 2011; Naderpour et al., 2019). 
The WUI (wildland-urban interface) fire problem is inherently complex, as it is characterized by the 
interaction of multiple phenomena of diverse nature occurring at different observation scales: the 
macroscale or landscape scale, the mesoscale or settlement scale and the microscale or home/plot scale 
(Elsa Pastor et al., 2019). It is at the microscale where the specific events that jeopardize residents and 
assets can be observed and where prevention actions at home-owner level must be undertaken. The WUI 
microscale is quite often characterized by the presence of all sorts of combustible elements around 
structures (ground fuels, ornamental vegetation, stored material, etc.) whose hazard is poorly 
characterized and thus remarkably disregarded by residents (Elsa Pastor et al., 2019). 
The hazard associated with domestic LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) storage tanks, used as energy source 
for heating, hot water production or cooking in WUI developments has to be highlighted in this 
framework. This type of infrastructure may be seriously threatened by a fire, particularly in those cases 
where negligence or regulatory gaps allow a very close exposure of these tanks to flames coming from 
nearby fuels. In these situations, the tank will heat up and the pressure will start increasing. If the tank 
pressure reaches the Pressure Relief Valve (PRV) set point, this will open, releasing LPG that will 
immediately ignite forming a jet fire. The jet fire will hence worsen the heat load to the tank and the 
surroundings. If no measure is taken in order to cool down the tank and/or extinguish the fire, the tank 
may fail, leading to a loss of containment. Depending on the type of failure, intense jet fires from shell 
cracks, BLEVEs (Boiling liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions) and fireballs may follow (Abbasi and 
Abbasi, 2007; Birk and Cunningham, 1994; Leslie and Birk, 1991; Mcdevitt, 1990; Moodie et al., 1985). 
Furthermore, fragments resulting from the destruction of the tank shell can be projected to the 
surrounding, potentially worsening the consequences of the explosion (Tugnoli et al., 2013). 
In recent WUI fire events (e.g. Benitatxell, Spain, 2016; Madeira, Portugal, 2016; Calabassas, California, 
2016; Mati, Greece, 2018) these type of infrastructures were dangerously affected (Figure 1). The lack 
of an effective safety distance between the LPG tank and the surrounding fuels caused the opening of the 
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safety relief valves and intense jet fires. Although explosions did not occur, the magnitude of the 
consequences in case of a BLEVE-Fireball event could have been severe, given the high population and 
assets density that usually characterize WUI areas. Being able to assess whether a given fire scenario 
represents or not a threat for LPG tanks integrity is therefore critical to ensure safety of this type of 
installations.  
 
Figure 1. a) Calabassas fire (California, 2016 – credit KABC-TV). A propane jet fire can be observed at 
the center of the image (inside the yellow dotted ellipse). Flames from ornamental fuels are close to the 
tank. LPG infrastructure was inside a kindergarten; b) Domestic LPG tank in Benitatxell (Spain, 2016 - 
credit D. Caballero) damaged by a jet fire from the PRV. The tank was surrounded by an ornamental 
hedgerow that ignited by spotting.  
 
Looking at the problem under the perspective of a bow-tie analysis (Delvosalle et al., 2006), the event 
“vessel failure” can be considered as the critical event in the center of the bow-tie diagram. As suggested 
by Reniers et al. (2018), the natural event (the WUI fire in this case) is on the fault tree side, while the 
consequences of the vessel failure (BLEVE, fireball, missiles projection) are on the right side (event 
tree). 
Models for the estimation of the consequences generated by the final events, such as overpressure and 
thermal radiation, are well established in literature (Uijt de Haag and Ale, 1999). Even if these models 
were mainly developed considering accident scenarios typical of the process industry, they are 
independent from the fire conditions leading to the tank failure and can therefore be applied also in the 
case of LPG tanks exposed to wildfires and WUI fires. 
On the other hand, the analysis of the left wing of the bow-tie is specific and, to be effective, requires a 
dedicated approach. This must encompass the detailed characterization of the fire scenario, the 




vulnerability. As discussed in the following, the first of these three points (the characterization of the fire 
scenario) is particularly critical. However, most of the wildfire spread models available cannot cope with 
the complexity of wildfires behaviour when they approach the WUI (Rehm and Mell, 2009). 
This paper presents a comprehensive study of the problem of LPG domestic tanks exposure to WUI fires, 
addressing mostly the left wing of the bow tie-diagram. First, an analysis of the existent regulations in 
European countries prone to wildfires and fires at WUI is carried out, with the aim of detecting gaps, 
deficiencies and inconsistencies between regulations. The focus is mainly on the definition of separation 
and safety distances between the tank and the flammable materials and/or vegetation that represent a 
measure to prevent tank failure. Current approaches to fire characterization at the WUI and vulnerability 
assessment of LPG tanks exposed to fire were reviewed. A methodology was developed to support the 
assessment of LPG tanks integrity in WUI fire scenarios. The methodology is based on a three step 
approach addressing fire source characterization at different levels of detail and on the assessment of 
LPG tank vulnerability based on a CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) model. 
2 Regulatory framework at European level 
Worldwide the use and installation of domestic LPG tanks is not harmonized. In the European Union, 
different regulations are issued by each Member State (MS). Thus, prescription specifying, among others 
safety distances from the LPG supply unit to vulnerable elements, storage of flammable materials and 
sources of ignitions, may be extremely variable. A detailed and comprehensive analysis of all regulations 
is out of the scope of the present study. In the following, regulations from France (JORF, 1979), Greece 
(ΦΕΚ, 1993), Italy (GUDRI, 2004) Portugal (DRE, 2002), Spain (AENOR, 2008) and UK (HSE, 2016) 
will be considered for the sake of comparison and to analyze the specific case-studies. 
Figure 2 shows a comparison of minimum safety distances from domestic above-ground LPG tanks 
according to the legislation of the European countries listed above. In general, it can be noted how 
prescriptions are not harmonized. Italy has the most conservative requirements, whereas Spain has the 
less restrictive ones. The Spanish regulation, for instance, indicates that for tanks with volume within 1 
and 5 m3 in volume, safety distances should be of 2m. This distance can be reduced by a 50% for smaller 
tanks. The Italian legislations prescribes a safety distance that is more than twice of that required in Spain 
for the same tank volumes. Thus, strong discrepancies are present in the standards, even within countries 





Figure 2: Minimum safety distances as a function of tank volume V (in m3) for different European 
countries. 
Another important issue that is worth to remark is that not all the standards in the different countries 
listed in Figure 2 explicitly regulate the possible presence of vegetation in the proximity of the tank. The 
Greek regulation clearly states that “the floor of the storage area must be kept clean and free of dry grass, 
grass and foreign objects”. Similarly, the HSE (UK) recommends that there should be no trees or shrubs 
within the safety distance reported in the standard. The Italian regulation requires that no vegetation is 
present in an area of 5 m around the tank. On the other hand, the Portuguese regulation has a more general 
statement, not allowing the presence of flammable products within the safety distance reported in Figure 
2. The French regulations simply mention that no storage of flammable material can be present in the 
area defined by safety distance. Clearly enough, such statement does not cover the case of ornamental 
vegetation commonly placed in WUI microscale and that might be ignited in case of wildfires. The 
Spanish regulation does not address the issue of the possible presence of fuels in the proximity of LPG 
tanks. 
Indeed, there are countries in which the potential hazard produced by the presence of vegetation in the 
proximity of LPG tanks is not properly considered. As shown in Figure 1, this regulatory gap may 
produce dangerous situations in case of WUI fires. Furthermore, even in the countries with a standard 
explicitly addressing the issue, situations such as those depicted in Figure 1 demonstrate that current 
prescriptions might be not sufficient to avoid escalation events involving domestic LPG tanks in the case 
of severe wildfires. 
In the framework of such jeopardized scenario, the need clearly emerges to support regulators towards 
better-informed decision-making in the determination of safety distances.  
V (tank volume) < 8 m3 8 ≤ V < 11
V < 0.5 0.5 ≤ V < 9 9 ≤ V
0.15 ≤ V < 3 3 ≤ V < 5 5 ≤ V < 13
V < 0.5 0.5 ≤ V < 5 5 ≤ V < 12 12 ≤ V < 25
0.15 ≤ V < 1 1 ≤ V < 5 5 ≤ V < 13
0.15 ≤ V < 0.5 0.5 ≤V< 2.5 2.5 ≤ V < 9











3 Current approaches to fire characterization in WUIs and 
vulnerability assessment of LPG tanks exposed to fire 
Addressing the problem of the assessment of LPG tanks vulnerability in WUIs requires to focus the 
attention on two aspects. The first is the characterization of the fire behavior in such a complex 
environment. The second concerns the analysis of the response of LPG tanks to fire exposure in the 
specific conditions present in WUIs. 
3.1 Fire source characterization at the WUI 
Wildfires spread is usually described as an advancing fire front featuring specific intensity, rate of spread, 
and flame height, which are influenced by the landscape characteristics, the weather conditions and the 
fuel properties (Rehm and Mell, 2009). This description is at the base of the most common wildfire 
models, such as FARSITE (Finney, 1994) and FlamMap (Finney, 2006), which are designed to predict 
the wildfire spread for long periods of time (hours to days) and over large areas (in the order of several 
square kilometers), where the fuel type distribution can be considered quite uniform (an extensive review 
of wildfire simulators is presented by Sullivan (2009). However, as pointed out by Murphy et al. (2007), 
observations show that wildfire behavior may change considerably when the fire front approaches the 
WUI. Here, local variations in the type and spatial distribution of fuel play an important role in the way 
the fire spreads and affects structures (Rehm and Mell, 2009).  
Affectation of structures due to the presence of fire at the WUI is a complex and multistep process. 
Considering a single lot (i.e. a house together with the set of objects/ornamental vegetation in its 
proximity), the sequence of events characterizing the interaction with a wildfire can be divided in four 
phases: Pre-impact, Impact, Fire transfer and Post-fontal combustion. The Pre-impact is the phase in 
which a nearby fire is approaching the settlement, but has not reached the house yet. As the fire front 
gets closer, the probability that that smoke and flying embers transported by wind reach the lot, the garden 
elements and the house increases. These firebrands may set fire in vegetation, ornamental plants and 
several other materials and objects present in the garden near the house or the house itself. In the Impact 
phase, the fire front is facing the house at such a distance that thermal radiation (and sometimes flame 
impingement) have a direct effect on the house and the surrounding items, the ignition of which is quite 
likely. If this happens, the fire propagates through the elements in the lot (Fire transfer phase), with the 
possibility of triggering more and more fires. Finally, in the Post-frontal combustion phase, all the 
objects, materials and house parts that ignited in any of the previous phases continue burning with or 
without flames for longer periods, possibly causing further escalation.  
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As pointed out by Mell et al. (2009), large scale wildfire spread models cannot deal with the complexity 
of such process. For this reason, they cannot be effectively applied to assess the fire risk at the WUI. 
They suggest that the solution may be represented by the development of validated physics-based 
numerical models such as WFDS1. 
According to Rehm and Mell (2009), one of the main issues is represented by the large spectrum of 
spatial and time scales associated with wildfires at the WUI. An interesting approach to address the 
multiscale nature of the problem of assessing the wildfire impact on a specific target was proposed by 
and Khakzad (2019), where a strategy to link large scale wildfire simulator results with vulnerability 
models working at a much smaller scale is presented. Here, the fire spread is simulated using an approach 
that integrates a dynamic Bayesian network with data provided by the Canadian Forest Fire Behavior 
System, whereas the impact on the target (in this case an atmospheric tank placed in an oil terminal) is 
estimated using the expression for the calculation of the time to failure proposed by Landucci et al. 
(2009). Such equation was derived using an integral model for the fire response of pressure vessels and 
requires as input the heat load received from the vessel to the fire. The link between the wildfire spread 
model and the vulnerability model is represented by a solid flame model (see Section 4.1 for more details) 
that takes as input the fire intensity provided by the wildfire spread model and provides as output the heat 
load to be used in the equation for the estimation of the time to failure.  
Undoubtably, the work of Khakzad (2019) introduces an important improvement the field of the 
assessment of wildfire risk on industrial plants. However, the proposed approach is not specifically 
developed to capture the features of WUI fire scenarios. 
 
3.2 LPG tank vulnerability 
The response of LPG vessels to fire exposure was investigated since the sixties (Bray, 1964). Several fire 
test campaigns have been carried out by different research groups and institutions (most of which are 
summarized in the literature reviews presented by Moodie (1988) and Birk (2006)), which allowed 
increasing the understanding of the physical phenomena involved in these scenarios (e.g. Aydemir et al., 
1988; Sumathipala et al., 1992; Birk and Cunningham, 1996). 
In parallel to experimental studies, more and more complex models were developed over the years, aimed 
at reproducing the phenomena occurring inside a vessel under fire exposure, and predicting 
pressurization rate, temperature distributions and time to failure. Early approaches are based on strong 




simplifying assumptions (Aydemir et al., 1988; Beynon et al., 1988; Birk, 1988, 1983; Germany et al., 
1990; Gong et al., 2004; Graves, 1973; Johnson, 1998b, 1998a; Venart, 2000; Yu et al., 1992): the tank 
is divided in one or more zones (or nodes), for which integral mass and energy balances are solved. Such 
models rely on empirical expressions with a limited range of applications. Furthermore, they neglect key 
phenomena such as thermal stratification and boiling. More recently, approaches based on CFD codes 
were proposed (Bi et al., 2011; D’Aulisa et al., 2014; Hadjisophocleous et al., 1990; Scarponi et al., 2019, 
2018a; Yoon and Birk, 2004).  
Despite such advancements, the vast majority of the studies addressed the effects of hydrocarbon pool 
and jet fires (i.e. scenarios that are likely to occur in an industrial environment). So far, very little attention 
was dedicated to the analysis of pressure tanks exposed to fire in WUI scenarios. Heymes and co-workers 
(2013c, 2013b) recently carried out a study specifically addressing such framework, performing a set of 
fire tests on a 2.3 m3 LPG tank exposed to a distant source of radiation, mimicking the effect of a forest 
fire. They considered a crown fire scenario with a 100 m wide by 40 m high fire front and average (and 
constant) emissive power of 90 kW/m2, affecting a tank positioned at 50 m from the fire. They also 
provided a method to estimate safety distances (Heymes et al., 2013a) based on the guideline provided 
in the API 2501 (American Petroleum Institute, 2001). Few years later, Scarponi et al. (2018b) proposed 
a 2D CFD modelling setup able to reproduce with good accuracy the experimental results obtained by 
Heymes and co-workers (2013c, 2013b). 
Although the above mentioned publications represent pioneering works in the field, a comprehensive 
analysis of the problems related to fire affecting pressure vessels at the WUI is still missing. 
4 Methodology proposed for the assessment of LPG tank vulnerability 
at the WUI 
In the light of the above discussion on the assessment of the effect of wildfires on specific targets at the 
WUI, the methodology presented here can be considered as the connection between large scale wildfire 
spread simulations and the meso- and microscale approach needed to correctly model WUI fires. The 
methodology proposed addresses the representation of WUI fire and the tank integrity assessment. This 
is done approaching the three steps represented in Figure 3: the characterization of the fire source (e.g. 
flame shape, emissive power, transient behavior), the simulation of the tank response (e.g. pressurization 
rate, steel and lading temperatures) and the tank integrity assessment, which addresses the threat posed 




Figure 3: Schematization of the problem and of the methodological approach (?̇?𝑞′′is heat flux through the 
external surface of the tank). Indicators are defined in Section 4.3. 
4.1 Step 1 – Fire source characterization 
The aim of the first step (the red block in Figure 3) is to characterize the fire scenario, providing the 
inputs required for the analysis of the tank response. Thus, the heat load coming from the fire needs to 
be defined. This is usually carried out defining the heat flux (?̇?𝑞") induced by a fire on a LPG tank (as well 
as for any generic target, at time t and at point ?⃗?𝑥 on the target external surface) is the sum of radiative 
and convective contributions as expressed by Eq. 1: 
 
?̇?𝑞"(?⃗?𝑥, 𝑡𝑡) = 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝑤𝑤�𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(?⃗?𝑥, 𝑡𝑡)4 − 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤(?⃗?𝑥, 𝑡𝑡)4� + ℎ𝑔𝑔(?⃗?𝑥, 𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔(?⃗?𝑥, 𝑡𝑡) − 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤(?⃗?𝑥, 𝑡𝑡)� Eq. (1) 
 
where 𝜎𝜎 is the Stefan-Boltzman constant, 𝜀𝜀𝑤𝑤 is the emissivity of the wall, 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 is the wall temperature and 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 is the equivalent black body temperature (representative of the incident radiation hitting the tank 
surface): 




 Eq. (2) 
 
The values of the incident radiation I (representing the radiative contribution of both the fire and the 
ambient), the temperature of the gases 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 (air, flame, smoke) in contact with the tank surface and the 
convective heat transfer coefficient ℎ𝑔𝑔 need to be specified according to the fire scenario characteristics. 
The definition of such parameters is the particular objective of the first step of the methodology (the red 
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block in Figure 3). It is worth mentioning that, in cases where no direct impingement of the flames on 
the tank occurs, the convective term in Eq. (1) can be neglected. In these cases, this term would actually 
be negative (i.e. involving convective cooling of the tank surface), hence neglecting it results in a 
conservative approach from the safety standpoint, also considering the uncertainties in defining the fire 
scenario. Therefore, in scenarios with no flame impingement, spatial and temporal distribution of the 
incident radiation is the only required input. 
As pointed ou by Mell et al. (2009), in order to effectively carry out a fire risk assessment at the WUI, it 
is crucial to able to properly reproduce the fire behavior. This entails the use of tools that are able to 
accurately capture fire transient characteristics at small spatial and time scales, such as the flame 
geometry end emissive power. 
In the present methodology, three different approaches (options) are proposed to carry out the fire 
characterization step. The level of detail they provide in terms of description of the fire behavior at the 
micro and meso scales increases going from the first one to the last one. The selection of the approach to 
be used depends on available data, accuracy required and organizational factors such as time, costs and 
computational resources. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the possible options for the characterization of the fire scenario. The 
table also specifies the main inputs and the tools required to apply each approach. 
Option 1 represents the case in which the analyst already knows the heat load to be applied to the storage 
tank (e.g. when this comes from regulations, standards, prescriptions or experience). In this case it is 
possible to directly proceed with the definition of I, ℎ𝑔𝑔 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 (see Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)).  
Table 1: Different strategies to characterize the fire sources considered. 
Option Main Inputs Required tools 
1) Direct definition - Expert judgment or prescriptions - None 
2) Solid flame model - Scenario geometry 
- Fire emissive power (as a function of time) or 
fire Heat Release Rate curve (and radiative 
fraction)  
- Fire shape 
- Tool for the calculation of 
view factors 
3) Fire simulation 3.1 – Fire prescription 
- Scenario geometry 
- Fire HRR curve 




- Ambient conditions (temperature, humidity 
and wind) 
3.2 – Fire prediction 
- Scenario geometry 
- Solid fuel composition, density, heat capacity 
and thermal conductivity 
- Solid fuel particle size distribution and 
moisture content (for vegetation) 
- Solid fuel pyrolysis curve 
- Ambient conditions (temperature, humidity 
and wind) 
Option 2 is based on the solid flame model concept (Eisenberg et al., 1975): the flame is considered as a 
solid body having defined shape and dimensions, with an emissive power E. Thus, the incident radiation 
I to remote points (e.g. the tank surface) is obtained using Eq. 3, where Γ is the air transmissivity (which 
is a function of the humidity and the concentration of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and can be 
calculated using empirical correlations) and f is the view factor between the remote point and the solid 
body representing the flame. Details about the calculation of the view factor under the assumption of 
uniform radiosity and that both the flame and the object surface emit and reflect diffusely can be found 
in the literature (Beatty, 2004; Eckert, 2004; Heymes et al., 2013c; Modest, 2003; Scarponi et al., 2018b).  
An example of application of Option 2 is reported by Scarponi and Heymes (2018), who considered the 
situation of a LPG tank exposed to the front of a wildfire. In the study, the fire emissive power and the 
flame shape were defined according to real scale experimental measurements and only a view factor 
calculation was needed to obtain I (a unitary value of air transmissivity was assumed). 
When fire emissive power and flame shape are not readily available, they should be derived. Two 
alternative routes are possible for the calculation of the fire emissive power: in the case of flames that 
can be approximated as a radiant grey body (i.e. for which the radiant intensity is independent of the 
wave length), Stefan-Boltzamann’s law (Eq. 4) can be used, where 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹 and TF are the flame emissivity 
𝐼𝐼 = Γ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 Eq. (3) 




  Eq. (5) 
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and temperature respectively. Alternatively, when 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹 and/or TF are unknown, Eq. 5 is considered. The 
latter is based on the Heat Release Rate (HRR) concept. According to the definition reported in the SFPE 
handbook (Hurley et al., 2002) the HRR is the rate at which the combustion reactions produce heat and 
is considered as “the single most important variable in fire hazard” (Babrauskas and Peacock, 1992). 
HRR curves are available from many sources in literature. For instance, the SFPE Handbook (Hurley et 
al., 2002) reports HRR curves for a series of common residential fuels (e.g. pallets, trash containers, 
bushes, etc.). Only a fraction 𝜒𝜒𝑟𝑟 (radiative fraction) of the heat produced by the combustion reactions is 
released in the form of radiation. Values of 𝜒𝜒𝑟𝑟 are reported in literature for several common fuels (Hurley 
et al., 2002). The last parameter needed for the evaluation of Eq. 5 is the surface area (A) of the solid 
representing the flame, which depends on the shape of the fire. This must be estimated using empirical 
formulas correlating it to the HRR, as those proposed by Anderson et al. (2006). The fire shape is also 
needed for the calculation of the view factor in Eq. 3. 
By this approach, a complete characterization of the incident radiation I is obtained. As for the 
temperature of the gas in contact with the tank wall and the related convective heat transfer coefficient 
(𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 and ℎ𝑔𝑔 in Eq. 1), it must be pointed out that the solid flame model is only valid for a distant fire 
source. This means that scenarios involving flame impingement cannot be analyzed using this method 
and that the use of Option 2 is limited to fire scenarios in which the flame is not in contact with the wall 
of the tank. In such cases, the gas temperature 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 can be considered as the ambient temperature. The 
convective heat transfer coefficient ℎ𝑔𝑔 can be estimated through empirical correlations for the calculation 
of the natural convection heat transfer coefficient around a horizontal cylinder, as the one reported by 
Martynenko and Khramtsov (2005): 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 0.13 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅1/3 Eq. (6) 
where Ra is the Rayleigh number and Nu is the Nusselt number (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = ℎ𝑔𝑔𝐷𝐷
𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
; where D is the tank diameter 
and kair is the thermal conductivity of the air). Typical values for ℎ𝑔𝑔 in cases like the ones of interest here 
range between 1 and 10 W/(m2K). 
The last option to carry out the fire source characterization step is the use of a fire simulation software 
(Option 3), in which the scenario under analysis is reproduced and spatial and temporal distributions of 
I, ℎ𝑔𝑔 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 on the surface of the target object (in this case the LPG tank) are obtained. In the present 
methodology, the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
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(NIST) of the Unites States Department of Commerce is considered as the reference tool to carry out the 
simulations. The key point when considering Option 3 is how the fire is simulated. Two different options 
were defined to carry out the simulation: Option 3.1 – Fire Prescription, and Option 3.2 - Fire Prediction. 
The first option consists of simulating a burning element as a solid shape with an assigned HRR curve 
on its surface. The software models the fire as the ejection of a gaseous fuel from the surface that ignites, 
generating the flame. This procedure is similar to that of Option 2, with the important difference that I, 
ℎ𝑔𝑔 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 on the target are obtained by the fire simulator solving the transport equations for mass, 
momentum and energy (including radiation transport) through the problem domain.  
Option 3.2 represents the most advanced approach to the simulation of a fire scenario, fully exploiting 
the capabilities of the fire simulation software in the modelling of the combustion of solid fuels. All the 
steps characterizing the combustion process of a solid fuel are considered (although applying some 
simplifying assumptions according to data availability and required level of detail): the heat-up phase, 
the pyrolysis process leading to the production of gaseous fuels and the final burning process (a 
comprehensive description of such processes can be found in Hurley et al. (2002). In other words, the 
heat released from the fuel surface is not prescribed (as it is in Option 3.1 using a HRR curve), but rather 
is predicted using the potentialities of the fire simulator. 
Due to the ability of capturing local fire characteristics with a high degree of detail, it is advisable, when 
data are available, to carry out the fire source characterization by Option 3. This approach also allows 
simulating scenarios in which fire impingement takes place. 
 
4.2 Step 2 – Tank response analysis  
The previous step allows obtaining the spatial and time varying maps of I, ℎ𝑔𝑔 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 on the tank surface. 
The setting of these parameters represents the boundary condition for the CFD simulation of the tank 
response when affected by a fire. In the methodology presented here, the analysis of the latter is carried 
out by a CFD analysis. The ANSYS® Fluent® 18.2.0 code was used, applying the CFD modelling setup 
proposed by Scarponi et al. (2019). The tank (both the steel wall and the lading) is discretized in a 
computational grid and governing equations for mass, momentum, energy and turbulent quantities are 
solved throughout the computational domain. According to the computational resources and the 
geometrical characteristics of the scenario to be analyzed (i.e. if I, ℎ𝑔𝑔 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 may be considered constant 
along the axial direction of the tank), a 2D or a 3D approach can be applied. Further details on the possible 
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approaches to be applied in this step are reported in literature (Scarponi et al., 2019, 2018a; Tugnoli et 
al., 2019) 
The application of the CFD procedure provides a large amount of data describing the thermo-fluid 
dynamic response of the vessel to fire exposure. In particular, it is possible to obtain pressurization 
curves, wall temperature profiles, temperature distribution in the liquid and vapor phases and evolution 
of the velocity field. 
4.3 Step 3 – Assessment of tank integrity 
In the last step of the methodology, the results of the CFD simulations are analyzed with the aim of 
understanding whether the fire scenarios under consideration may compromise tank integrity.  
According to the API 2510 (American Petroleum Institute, 2001), the integrity of an LPG tank exposed 
to fire is not compromised as long as: i) the tank is equipped with a properly designed PRV (i.e. the PRV 
prevents the vessel pressure from rising more than 21% above the design pressure) and ii) the incident 
radiation is below 22 kW/m2. This is a very useful indication and may even avoid the necessity of 
carrying out the second step of the methodology. In fact, the value of the incident radiation is already 
available after the fire characterization (Step 1). 
However, assuming the threshold value suggested by API 2510 (22 kW/m2) would often be over-
conservative. Furthermore, the radiation threshold value provided was derived considering a distant fire 
source and is not valid in case of flame impingement. 
Therefore, it is important to have alternatives to establish whether the tank integrity may be compromised 
by the fire scenario defined in step 1. It is well known that tank failure mainly occurs due to high wall 
temperatures. In fact, steel strength degradation at high temperatures may produce a failure even when 
the vessel pressure is within design limits (Manu et al., 2009). Assessing whether the tank would fail 
under specific fire conditions would require a detailed stress analysis based on full geometrical and 
mechanical details of the tank, which is out of the scope of the present study. A simplified approach to 
assess the possible mechanical weakening of the tank structure induced by the fire was presented by 
Scarponi et al. (2017). The authors introduced a “Strength Index” defined as the ratio between the surface 
area of the tank wall suffering mechanical weakening, identified as the surface area of the tank outer wall 
within which the temperature is higher than 400 °C, and the total surface area of the tank. The temperature 
of 400 °C was selected since above this value the yield strength of plain carbon steel is decreased by 70% 
with respect to ambient temperature (25 °C) conditions (Birk, 1995). In the present study, a “Weakened 
Surface Index” (WSI) is introduced as defined in Table 2. This is based on the “Strength Index” with two 
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modifications. The numerator of the WSI is defined as the maximum extension of the tank outer wall 
surface area in which the temperature exceeds 400°C over the simulation time (𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚). This 
modification is required since the “Strength Index” refers to steady state conditions, which is not the case 
of the scenarios of interest in the present study. The second modification is the replacement of total tank 
wall surface area at the denominator with the critical surface area, Sc (see Table 2). This parameter was 
derived from the work by Birk (2005), who studied the effect of defective thermal protection coating on 
LPG tanks exposed to fire. Birk (2005) suggests that a rectangular defect larger than 1.2 x 0.4 m (resulting 
in a surface area of 0.48 m2) may cause a tank rupture in case of fire exposure. Here, this concept is 
extended considering that, if a fire generates a hot zone on the tank wall larger than Sc, the tank integrity 
is no longer ensured. Values of WSI higher than 1 indicate that the fire scenario under analysis represents 
a threat for the tank integrity. 
An additional critical point is represented by the PRV opening. In fact, although such event represents a 
safety measure to prevent the tank rupture, the jet fire resulting from the ignition of the fluid released by 
the valve increases the heat load to the tank and may contribute to worsen the consequences of the fire. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that scenarios in which the tank pressure reaches the PRV set point 
are not desirable. For this reason, the Pressure Relief Valve Index (PRVI) is introduced. This is the ratio 
between the maximum pressure reached during the tank response simulation and the PRV set point 
pressure (see Table 2). 
  
Table 2: Indicators for the assessment acceptability of the LPG tank response to fire. 
Indicator Definition Notes 




Sa,max: maximum (over simulation time) 
surface area where the temperature is 
higher than 400°C 
Sc: critical surface area (0.48 m2) 




pmax: maximum pressure reached in the 
tank 
pPRV: PRV set point 
 
From the definitions presented above, fire scenarios resulting in values WSI and PRVI higher than 1 
have the potential to compromise tank integrity and/or to results in an escalation of consequences. 
However, WSI and PRVI are only lumped indexes representative of potentially hazardous conditions. 
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WSI depends on the value of Sc, that was derived bay extrapolation of experimental observations and 
shell be considered as an indicative critical value rather than an exact threshold. On the other hand, the 
PRVI is based on the value of the PRV set point. However, due to the high temperature reached under 
fire exposure, the spring in the PRV may experience softening (Heymes et al., 2013b), resulting in an 
actual opening pressure lower than the design one. In the following, a safety coefficient of 0.9 was applied 
to identify scenarios not having the potential to compromise the integrity of LPG installations.  
considering both such factors of uncertainty. 
5 Case studies 
A set of case studies is presented here with the aim of demonstrating the application of the methodology 
proposed in the previous section. Two different fire scenarios were analyzed. In the first (that will be 
referred as “Scenario 1” in the following), a tank is exposed to a fire from a neighboring burning fuel 
bed of Pinus halepensis slash. In the second scenario (“Scenario 2”), the tank is exposed to a burning 
hedgerow of Douglas fir trees. More details on the two fire scenarios are given below. 
In both cases, the reference target is a 1 m3 LPG tank (diameter = 1000 mm, length = 1470 mm, wall 
thickness = 6 mm, with semi-elliptical ends) distant 3 m from the fire, which is in compliance with the 
safety distances prescribed in Portugal, Spain and UK (see Figure 2) 
The aim of the analysis of Scenario 1 is to provide a detailed description of how each of the steps in 
Figure 3 is carried out. In Scenario 2, the focus is on the application of Option 3.1 and 3.2 proposed to 
carry out the fire source characterization (the first step in Figure 3). As discussed in the following, none 
of the scenarios analyzed considers fire impingement. It is important to remark that this is only due to 
the specific characteristics of the selected scenarios and should not be intended as a limitation of the 
proposed methodology. Actually, impingement or engulfment scenarios are not the more representative 
scenarios expected for WUI fires involving LPG tanks, and fire impingement on LPG tanks is extensively 
addressed in several literature studies (e.g. see Moodie, (1988), Leslie and Birk, (1991) and papers cited 
therein). 
5.1 Scenario 1 
Scenario 1 involves quite severe fire conditions, the characteristics of which were derived from fire 
experiment monitoring (E Pastor et al., 2019). In this fire test, a 13m by 6m fuel bed of Pinus halepensis 
slash (the average height of which was approximatively 1.5 m) was ignited with the aim of studding a 
fire front close to a vulnerable target. This scenario represented cases in which the neighboring plot to 
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the one having the LPG tank is abandoned and accumulated unmanaged fuel able to burn. Such situation 
is actually frequent in Mediterranean WUI areas. 
Step 1 - Fire source characterization 
The fire characterization was carried out following Option 2, introducing a solid flame model and 
assigning a fire emissive power. As shown in Figure 4, it was assumed that the fire generated during the 
test could be approximated to a rectangle with constant shape and dimensions. The rectangle was 
considered to have an inclination of 60˚ with respect to simulate the effect of the wind. An emissive 
power varying according to the transient profile reported in Figure 5b was assumed (dotted red line).  
Based on fire characterization, the incident radiation to the tank wall was calculated. First, the view 
factors between each of the points lying on the tank wall and the plane representing the fire were 
calculated following the approach reported in Scarponi et al. (2018c). Figure 5a shows the results of this 
calculation. Assuming conservatively a unitary air transmissivity (Γ = 1 in Eq. 3), the incident radiation 
(IP) at point P on the tank surface was obtained using Eq. 7, where E is the fire emissive power, T∞ is the 
temperature of the surrounding (set at 20 ˚C in this study) and 𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹→𝑃𝑃 is the view factor between the fire 
and point P. 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 = 𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹→𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + (1 − 𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹→𝑃𝑃)𝑇𝑇∞4 Eq. (7) 
 
 
Figure 4: Geometric characteristics assumed for the fire and relative position with respect to the LPG 
tank for Scenario 1. The red rectangle represents the fire shape. 
Figure 5b provides an example of how the incident radiation changes considering different points on the 
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wall (e.g. point A and B in Figure 5b) are well above the 22 kW/m2 suggested as the incident heat flow 
by the API 2510 standard. 
 
Figure 5: a) Contour plot of view factors calculated at tank surface for the lay out shown in figure 4; b) 
incident radiation vs. time in different positions of the external wall (at the central vertical section) 
considering an ambient temperature of 20 ºC. 
As for 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 and ℎ𝑔𝑔, the convective heat transfer between the tank and the surrounding air was not taken 
into account. This is a conservative assumption since it eliminates the cooling effect of air. 
Step 2 - Tank response simulation 
This step consists of the analysis of the tank response by means of CFD modelling. Since in this case 
study the lay-out is symmetric with respect to the vertical plane (perpendicular to the tank axis) cutting 
the tank center, only half of the tank was considered in order to save computational time (see Figure 6a). 
The problem domain (the tank solid wall and its internal volume, see Figure 6b) was discretized using 
an unstructured grid obtained as a combination of tetrahedrons and hexahedrons with a maximum edge 
size of 3 cm (2 cm for the cell lying onto the external wall). In order to achieve appropriate resolution in 
the proximity of the inner wall (see Figure 6c), where the gradients of temperature and velocity are high, 
the grid was refined defining an inflation region (25 layers with a volume growth rate of 1.1) with a first 
















































Figure 6: a) Tank portion considered for the CFD simulation of the tank response; b) overview of the 
computational grid; c) detail showing the increased grid resolution in the near wall region (grey and 
green cells refer to the fluid and the solid domains respectively). 
The tank lading was assumed as pure propane, the material properties of which were defined as a function 
of temperature according to data reported by Liley et al., (1999). The thermal properties of carbon steel 
were considered for the tank wall (CEN - European Committee for Standardization, 1998). The boundary 
conditions along the outer wall were defined according to the results obtained in Step one. The no-slip 
condition was assigned to the inner wall. At the beginning of the simulation, the fluid was considered to 
be motionless, the temperature was set to 20 °C and the pressure at 8.36 bar (corresponding to the 
saturation of pure propane at 20 °C). A value of 18 bar was considered as the opening pressure of the 
PRV in both cases. 
As for the degree of filling, two different cases where analyzed in order to study its effect on the tank 
response. In the first case, a 20% of liquid was considered (low filling level case, referred to as S1_20% 
in the following). In the second, an 80% filling level was considered (high filling level case, referred to 
as S1_80%).  
Two additional cases were analyzed (that will be referred to as S1_20%_ins and S1_80%_ins in the 
following), in which the tank is covered by 20 mm layer of thermal insulation (vermiculite-cement 
coating, the physical properties of which were taken from Gomez-Mares et al. (2012)). In the CFD 
simulation the presence of the insulation layer was defined using the shell conduction option available in 
the software. This creates virtual layers (in this case 4 layer each of which with a thickness of 5 mm) in 
which the transient heat conduction equation is solved in all the three spatial directions (see ANSYS inc, 
2012 for further details). 
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In the following, the analysis of the data provided by CFD simulations is carried out focusing on 
pressurization curves and wall temperature profiles, which are the variables of interest when the tank 
integrity is of concern. A more detailed and fundamental study of CFD results considering, for instance, 
the temperature distribution in the liquid and vapor phases, evolution of the velocity field and liquid 
thermal expansion can be found in literature (D’Aulisa et al., 2014; Scarponi et al., 2019, 2018a, 2018b).  
Figure 7a shows the results obtained for the internal pressure. Regardless the filling degree, the pressure 
increase in the tanks featuring thermal insulation is negligible (≈ 0.1 and ≈ 0.2 bar with respect to the 
initial pressure for the S1_20%_ins and the S1_80%_ins respectively). The situation drastically changes 
when thermal insulation is absent. The pressure rise is faster when the tank is 80% full of liquid. Higher 
values of pressure are attained in this case, where the PRV opens after about 400s. Differently, in the 
S1_20% case the pressure remains well below the PRV set point, reaching a maximum value of 13.1 bar.  
 
Figure 7: a) Pressure vs. time and b) maximum wall temperature obtained for different filling levels. 
This difference is due to the contribution of the boiling liquid at the tank wall. In fact, in the case featuring 
the lowest filling degree, the shell portion wetted by the liquid is exposed to a quite low incident radiation 
and nucleate boiling occurs in a very limited part of the domain. On the other hand, when the tank is 80% 
full of liquid, the surface on which boiling takes place is much more extended, producing a fast increase 
in the vapor phase mass and speeding up the pressurization process. It is interesting to notice how the 
tank keeps pressurizing well beyond the instant of time in which the fire emissive power curve starts 
decreasing (see Figure 5, where the curve assumed for the fire emissive power vs. time is reported) and 
that the pressure inside the tank remains high even when the fire is almost extinguished. 
Differently from pressure, Figure 7b shows that the maximum wall temperature is not influenced by the 





















































80 or 85% depending on the country). This is true for all the cases analyzed. In the presence of thermal 
insulation (cases S1_20%_ins and S1_80%_ins), the temperature increase is very limited (≈ 10 °C with 
respect to the initial temperature). On the contrary, in both the S1_20% and the S1_80% cases, the peak 
wall temperature exceeds 400°C and remains above this threshold for several minutes. Analyzing the 
temperature distribution over the external wall, it evident that the region suffering mechanical weakening 
due to the high temperature is quite extended in both cases. This is clearly visible in Figure 8a and b (data 
shown refer to S1_20% and S1_80% cases only, in which thermal insulation is not present), where the 
area of the wall featuring a temperature higher than 400 °C is highlighted in red (data after 240s of fire 
exposure are considered). A similar consideration can be made looking at Figure 8c and d, showing the 
temperature profiles at intervals of 120 s along the curve given by the intersection between the tank wall 
and the symmetry plane perpendicular to the tank axis (for cases S1_20% and S1_80% only). It is well 
visible how the liquid produces a cooling effect on the steel, limiting the temperature in the portion of 






Figure 8: Region of the external wall with temperatures higher than 400 °C for a) S1_20%; and b) 
S1_80%  cases (time = 240 s). External wall temperature profiles at the symmetry plane perpendicular 
to the tank axis at different intervals of time for c) S1_20% and the d) S1_80% cases. The shaded area 
in the polar plots highlights the portion of the wall wetted by the liquid. 
Step 3 – Assessment of tank integrity 
Specific indicators were calculated on the basis of the results of step 2, to allow understating the impact 
of the scenario on the safety of the tank. Figure 9 shows a comparison of the values calculated for the 
indicators (see Table 2) obtained for the four cases analyzed. 
Focusing on the cases where thermal insulation is not present, the PRVI is equal to 1 for the case featuring 
the higher filling degree (S1_80%) and 0.73 for the other, suggesting that, even considering the 
c) S1_20 % d) S2_80 %
T > 400 °CT < 400 °C
a) S1_20 % b) S2_80 %




uncertainties in the definition of the fire scenario, the risk of having a jet fire generated by the opening 
of the PRV is quite low for the latter case. The same applies, regardless the filling level, to the cases in 
which the tank is protected by thermal insulation. 
The WSI indicates that, in both the S1_20% and the S1_80% cases, the maximum extension of the area 
experiencing this phenomenon is higher than the critical value SC. The values obtained (1.04 and 1.29 
for the S1_20% (WSI =1.04) and the S1_80% cases (WSI =1.29) are both exceed than the acceptance 
criteria (0.9) suggested in the present study. On the other hand, when the tank features thermal insulation 
(cases S1_20%_ins and S1_80%_ins), the WSI equals zero. 
It may be concluded that, if no protection measure is in place, Scenario 1 represents a threat for the tank 
integrity, regardless of the filling degree. On the contrary, Figure 9 shows that thermal insulation may 
provide effective mitigation of the risk of tank failure for the scenario analyzed. 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of the values of the indicators obtained for the S1_20 % (blue bars), the S1_80 % 
(green bars), the S1_20 %_ins (withe bars with blue stripes) and the S1_80 %_ins cases (withe bars with 
green stripes). 
5.2 Scenario 2 
A second scenario was considered in which the same LPG tank considered for Scenario 1 was exposed 
to a different reference fire, generated assuming a geometry based on a row of six Douglas fir trees 
catching fire. The reason at the base of this choice is the availability of literature data describing the 



















burning tests carried out on Douglas fir trees in a controlled environment. Figure 10 shows an overview 
of geometrical characteristics of Scenario 2, defined on the basis of the data reported by Mell et al. (2009). 
The trees were assumed 2.05m high (0.15m of clear trunk base and 1.90m of crown), with a conical 
canopy having a 1.6 m diameter base. The tank was positioned 3m away from the trees. Two different 
weather conditions were explored: absence of wind and wind flowing in a direction perpendicular to the 
tank (see Figure 10) with the logarithmic speed profile for neutral atmospheric conditions described by 
Eq. 8: 
𝑈𝑈 = 𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑧𝑧 − 𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤0
𝑧𝑧0
�� Eq. (8) 
where U is the wind velocity profile along the vertical coordinate (z), 𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤0 is the height above the ground 
at which zero wind speed is achieved as a result of obstacles (𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤0 = 1.47 m corresponding to 2/3 the 
height of the ornamental tree), 𝑧𝑧0 is the roughness length (0.2 m accounting for the presence of land with 





Figure 10: Lay out (a) and b) lateral view of the trees and of the LPG tank in Scenario 2. Wind speed 
profile (c) considered for the FDS simulation in windy conditions. 
Step 1 – Fire source characterization 
As mentioned above, the analysis of Scenario 2 aims at providing a detailed description of how to apply 
Option 3.1 and 3.2 for fire source characterization. In both cases, the geometric characteristics of 
Scenario 2 were reproduced using the FDS6.7.1 software (see Figure 11a). In the simulations considering 
the presence of the wind, the wind speed profile calculated according to Eq. 8 was assigned to the 









































Figure 11: a) Computational domain considered for simulation of Scenario 2 using FDS; b) HRR curve 
for each of the Douglas fir trees in Scenario 2 obtained from (Mell et al., 2009). 
In Option 3.1, the trees were modelled as solid cones and the fire was simulated assuming the HRR curve 
reported in Figure 11b for the surface of each cone. In Option 3.2, the approach proposed by Mell et al. 
(2009) was applied (adapting the simulation setup from WFDS to FDS6.7.1). The tree crowns were 
modelled as distributed solid particles (according to experimental observations reported by Mell et al. 
(2009) into four size classes: foliage, roundwood of diameter < 3 mm, roundwood of diameter between 
3 and 6 mm and roundwood with a diameter between 6 and 10 mm. The total mass burned was assumed 
of 3.9 kg (dry mass). For all vegetation types, the following parameters were assumed: moisture on a dry 
weight basis of 14%, dry and wet bulk densities of 2.98 kg/m3 and 3.4 kg/m3 respectively. 
Given a heat source (simulated introducing a ring hot spot at the base of each tree, which induced a 
buoyant hot flow), the particles temperature increases and the moisture is removed. Then, the pyrolysis 
starts and fuel vapors are generated. Finally, the remaining char undergoes an oxidation process. For the 
sake of brevity, equations describing the pyrolysis process as well as other details on the simulation setup 
are not reported here. The reader is referenced to the paper of Mell and co-workers (2009) for the full 
details on the simulation approach.  
Figure 12 reports a series of snapshots showing the characteristics of the fire (after 10 s of simulation) as 




Figure 12: Characteristics of the fire in calm (a and b) and windy (c and d) conditions obtained from the 
fire simulator following Option 3.1 (a and c) Option 3.2 (b and d) after 10 s of simulation. 
In calm conditions (Figure 12a and b) the two modelling approaches show quite similar results, with the 
most complex one (Option 3.2) producing a slightly higher flame. On the other hand, when the presence 
of wind is taken into account (Figure 12c and d), the change in the flame shape is more evident. This is 
due to the fact that in Option 3.1 the trees behave as solid obstacles that the wind cannot cross. On the 
other hand, when particles are used to model the trees, air can flow through the crowns. In both the windy 
cases, the flame is remarkably tilted towards the tank. However, with the wind speed considered in the 
simulations, impingement conditions are never reached. It shall be noted that this does not exclude that 
a stronger wind may cause the flame to be in contact with the tank, increasing the resulting heat load. 
The differences (and similarities) in the fire characteristics observed in Figure 12 are reflected on the 
heat load to which the tank is exposed. This is visible in Figure 13a and b comparing the distribution of 
the incident radiation onto the tank side facing the fire (after 10 s of simulation) is reported obtained in 
each case considered in Figure 12. In calm conditions, Options 3.1 and 3.2 produce very similar results, 
whereas the difference in the incident radiation maps is quite pronounced when wind is blowing. This 
can also be observed in Figure 13c, reporting the incident radiation vs time curves at the center of the 
tank side facing the fire (highlighted with a red cross in Figure 13c). It is interesting to note how, when 
Option 3.1 is considered, the difference in the incident radiation between calm and windy conditions are 
far lower than the one obtained following Option 3.2. In all the four cases, the incident radiation is always 





Figure 13: a) Distribution of the incident radiation onto the tank side facing the fire (after 10 s of 
simulation) obtained following Option 3.1 and 3.2 in calm (a) and windy (b) conditions; incident 
radiation as a function of time at the center of the tank side facing the fire (red cross on tank shell). 
Step 2 – Tank response simulation 
The tank response step was carried out using the same setup and computational grid considered for the 
simulation of Scenario 1. The filling degree was set to 80%. A total of four cases were considered. Two 
of them, labelled as S2_3.1_C and S2_3.1_W, refer to the scenarios in which the boundary condition was 
defined according to the spatial and temporal distributions of I, ℎ𝑔𝑔 and 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 obtained using Option 3.1, for 
calm and windy conditions respectively. In the others (S2_3.2_C and S2_3.2_W), the output generated 
by Option 3.2 was considered.  
Figure 14a shows that, in all cases, the pressure increase in the tank is very limited. The maximum 
pressure (8.5 bar) is obtained for the S1_3.2_W case and is only 0.14 bar higher than the initial pressure. 
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The curves describing the maximum wall temperature in the two cases (Figure 14b) show a limited 
temperature increase: about 11°C for the S2_3.2_W case, 7 °C for the S2_3.2_C case and 5 °C in the 
remaining cases. 
 
Figure 14: a) Pressure curves and b) maximum wall temperature obtained for the S2_3.1_C (blue solid 
line), the S2_3.2_C (green solid line), S2_3.1_W (blue dotted line) and the S2_3.2_C (green dotted line) 
cases. 
Step 3 – Assessment of tank integrity 
The results reported in Figure 14 show that, regardless the presence of wind, Scenario 2 produces 
negligible effects in terms of pressure increase and temperature rise. This is reflected by the values of the 
KPIs calculated in Step 3 of the methodology. The PRVI indicator results 0.468, 0.469, 0.468 and 0.472 
for the S2_3.1_C, S2_3.2_C, S2_3.1_W and S2_3.2_W cases respectively, whereas the WSI is always 
equal to zero. Thus, it is possible to conclude that this scenario does not represent a threat for the tank 
integrity. The results confirm the assumption made after comparing the values of incident radiation in 
Figure 13 with the threshold value of 22 kW/m2 suggested by the API 2510. 
5.3 Summary of case study results 
The analysis of the case studies presented above provides an example of the application of the three steps 
of the methodology defined in the present work and summarized in Figure 3. The first scenario 
considered consists of a fire from a neighboring fuel bed burning (13 m long by 6 m wide) of Pinus 
halepensis slash. In the second one, the tank was exposed to a burning hedgerow of 6 Douglas fir trees. 
In both cases, the target was 1 m3 LPG tank placed at 3 m from the fire. The assessment of the fire impact 
on the tank, carried out evaluating the two indicators presented in Step 3, highlighted how Scenario 2 
produces negligible effects from the safety point of view, regardless the presence of wind. On the other 

















































tank integrity due to the high wall temperatures induced by the fire. Furthermore, it was shown that for 
high filling degrees (80 %), the exposure to the first fire scenario leads to the PRV opening. As mentioned 
in Section 4.3, this shall be considered as an unwanted event since the jet fire resulting from the ignition 
of the fluid released by the valve increases the heat load to the tank and may contribute to worsen the 
consequences of the fire, creating the potential for an escalation of consequences. Finally, it was 
demonstrated that the presence of thermal insulation may effectively mitigate the effect of the fire on the 
tank, reducing the risk of failure (and PRV opening). 
It is important to remark that the lay out of the tank and the position of the burning vegetation considered 
in both the fire scenarios analyzed are compatible with the requirements of regulations adopted in 
Portugal, Spain and UK. Therefore, the results obtained raise some concern about the adequacy of safety 
distances indicated in the regulations of several European countries.  
6 Discussion 
The methodology presented in this study provides a tool to assess whether the exposure of a LPG 
domestic tank to a given fire scenario can be deemed safe. 
Characteristics of fire scenarios that may be triggered by a WUI fire in the proximity of a LPG domestic 
vessel can vary considerably. They depend, among other factors, on the weather conditions, the type of 
fuel involved and the mutual position of the tank and the burning material. This makes the determination 
of the heat load to the tank quite challenging. For this reason, the first step of the proposed methodology 
presents multiple options to carry out the task. This ensures high flexibility in the variety of fire scenarios 
that can be analyzed, also according with the degree of detail required by the user and the availability of 
data. 
The limitations of step 1 are a direct consequence of the inherent limitations of the models used in the 
different options proposed. Option 1, where actually no model is considered, can only be used when the 
fire load is prescribed. Prescribed fire conditions are usually representative of very simple situations (e.g. 
full engulfment) and do not allow to capture the complex characteristics of fires scenario at the WUI. 
Option 2 is based on the solid flame model, allowing to take into consideration the geometric features of 
the scenario. The main limitation of this approach is that it cannot be used to simulate fire impingement. 
Furthermore, it requires the knowledge (or the estimation via simple empirical expressions) of the 
emissive power and the shape of the flame. 
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Using Option 3.1 makes possible to simulate fire impingement. Furthermore, flame shape and emissive 
power are not required as input of the model. However, the user must specify the fire HRR curve. This 
limits the use of Option 3.1 to the cases for which such parameter is available from experimental data. 
Option 3.2 represent the most advanced way of simulating the fire scenario, since the heat released from 
the fire is not predetermined, but modelled based on specific local conditions. The shortcoming of this 
approach is that it requires a considerable amount of inputs, such as the composition of the fuel and the 
parameters characterizing the combustion reactions. 
Finally, it should be noted that both Option 3.1 and Option 3.2 are subjected to the inherent limitations 
of the fire modelling software used in the analysis. For FDS6.7.1, these are reported in the software 
technical guide (McGrattan et al., 2016). 
Being Options 3.1 and 3.2 the ones ensuring the best accuracy among all the options proposed, they 
should be preferred to carry out the fire characterization step whenever data availability allows their use. 
Moreover, these are the only options that allow properly considering flame impingement. 
The assessment of the tank integrity is the most critical step of the present methodology. Concerning the 
risk of tank failure, determining whether the tank would rupture under specific fire conditions requires a 
detailed stress analysis based on full geometrical and mechanical details of the tank, which is out of the 
scope of the present study. Instead, an indicator based on the extension of the tank wall surface area 
suffering mechanical weakening was proposed. This provides an approach to assess whether the tank 
integrity is under threat. However, this represent a strong simplification if the complex phenomena 
leading to vessel failure are considered (Manu et al., 2009). 
 
7 Conclusions 
Managing Wildland-Urban-Interface (WUI) fires is a challenging task due to the inherent complexity of 
the WUI environment. To ensure the success of strategies for the protection of population and structures, 
safety measures have to be implemented at different scales (landscape, community and homeowner). The 
present study is focused on the homeowner scale and deals with the threat related to the presence of LPG 
domestic tanks in a WUI fire scenario. Recent accidents have demonstrated that the risk associated with 
this type of installations is far from negligible, but is often disregarded by residents. The survey of 
regulations detailed in the present study provides evidence of a lack of harmonization throughout 
European countries. Moreover, important gaps have been highlighted in specific provisions, particularly 
those referred to the presence of fuels near domestic LPG tanks. Furthermore, there is no general 
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agreement in the definition of safety distances. A 3-step methodology was developed to assess if the 
integrity of a domestic LPG tank exposed to WUI fire scenarios may be affected. This allows overcoming 
the limitations of most common wildfire spread models, that are not able to capture specific 
characteristics of wildfire behavior at the WUI, and that, therefore, can not be used to assess the risk of 
fire impact of targets in peculiar scenarios as those analyzed in the present study. The results obtained 
from the application of the methodology to a set of case studies rise some concern about the 
appropriateness of distances prescribed in the regulations of several European countries. Thus, future 
work will be devoted to the identification and the analysis of typical WUI fire scenarios involving LPG 
tanks, in order to carry a critical assessment of current prescriptions related to this kind of installation 
and highlight possible gaps in safety regulations. Outcomes from this modelling approach are envisaged 
to be the basis of scientific-based recommendations for future policy improvements, and may contribute 
to a more sound and harmonized definition of safety distances for LPG domestic tank at the WUI. 
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Nomenclature 
A Fire surface area (m2) 
𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 Constant in the wind profile equation (-) 
𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤0 Height above the ground at which zero wind speed is achieved (m) 
E Fire emissive power (W/m2) 
f View factor (-) 
𝑓𝑓𝐹𝐹→𝑃𝑃 View factor between the fire and point P on the tank surface (-) 
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ℎ𝑔𝑔 External convective heat transfer coefficient (W/m2 K) 
HRR Heat release rate (W) 
I Incident radiation (W/m2) 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃 Incident radiation on point P on the tank surface (W/m2) 
Na Nusselt number (-) 
PRVI Pressure Relief Valve Index (-) 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 Maximum pressure reached in the tank (bar) 
𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 Pressure relief valve set point (bar) 
?̇?𝑞′′ Heat flux (kW/m2) 
Ra Rayleigh number (-) 
𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 maximum surface area where the temperature is higher than 400°C (m2) 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 critical surface area (0.48 m2) 
t Time (s) 
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵,𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 Equivalent black body temperature (K) 
𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔 Temperature of the gas in contact with the outer tank wall (K) 
𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 Wall temperature (K) 
𝑇𝑇∞ Ambient temperature (K) 
U Wind speed (m/s) 
𝑁𝑁10 Wind speed at 10 m above the ground (m/s) 
V Tank valume (m3) 
𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 Weakened Surface Index (-) 
x Generic coordinate (m) 
𝜒𝜒𝑅𝑅 Radiative fraction (-) 
Z Elevation from the ground 
𝑧𝑧0 Ground roughness (m) 
𝜎𝜎 Stefan-Boltzman constant (8.57 ⋅ 10-8 W/(m2 K4) 
𝜀𝜀𝑤𝑤 Wall emissivity (-) 
𝜀𝜀𝑤𝑤 Fire emissivity (-) 
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